17 November 2011

The Value of Religious Peacemaking

In Chapter 4 of R. Scott Appleby's The Ambivalence of the Sacred, he looks at case studies where "militants for peace", religious actors strongly devoted to non-violence, have made a difference in peacemaking efforts. After spending most of the course examining religious violent actors, learning about religious non-violent actors has been a nice change. These religious peacemakers help to reframe the conflict from a conflict between one ethnic or religious group that is "good" and another "evil" into a conflict between those who seek peace and those who continue to use deadly violence. These "enemies" are to be fought with the moral voice and peaceful teachings of a religious tradition.

Throughout the semester, we've read about religious violence in many forms and remarked that these conflicts are shaped by myriad situational factors. The same can be said for religious peacemaking, which takes on as many forms as there are conflicts: Ghosananda's marches in Cambodia, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Alexandria Process, the Community of Sant'Egidio, all of these groups have used different methods to advocate for peace. What they have in common is their emphasis on the peaceful teachings of their religions and their sense of "mission" or "moral obligation" to devote themselves to working for peace.

I found the case of the Community of Sant'Egidio especially inspiring. To think that a small group of high school students who wanted to serve the poor and "Love thy enemy" could blossom into an international community of thousands negotiating for peace on the basis of unconditional friendship! This kind of success required a great deal of commitment and integrity from its members, and even then it was by no means the only factor in promoting peace. It was, however, a useful non-political catalyst that helped bring moral values and shared humanity into the conversation.

In order for a religious peacemaking group to be effective in the long term, Appleby says that that they must "span a spectrum of actors at different levels of society, all of whom are working in collaboration for the nonviolent resolution of conflict and the building of stable political structures and social relations" (122). That's quite a tall order, but some groups, like the Community of Sant'Egidio, the Mennonite Central Committee, and others, are working hard to make it possible. When religious peacemakers cooperate with other secular (governmental and non-governmental) peacemaking groups, their committment to moral values can help give the peacemaking efforts real strength. It seems fitting to me that the religion which was part of the problem also be part of the solution.

13 November 2011

Hindutva and the Front National

I've been thinking over the Kakar readings lately, and the readings on the "New Hindu Identity" really had a lot of strong parallels to the recent French debates on national identity. National identity has been a hot conversation topic in France over the past few years, and in 2009 the Minister of Culture announced the "Grand débat sur l’identité nationale"/Great Debate on National Identity. While the implementation of this national debate was a little stilted and forced, the topic of national identity was all over the news and many strong opinions were presented on the subject. The main question here was "What does it mean to be French?"

You would think that would be a simple question to answer.

But no. It was actually a highly controversial debate. Setting aside the frustrations of the many Frenchmen who were convinced the debate was designed only to make the government look good before elections, the debate also touched right on the hot-button issues of immigration and "communitarianism." After WWII, France needed workers to reconstruct their ravaged country, and turned to their North African colonies for manpower. Eventually the workers were allowed to bring their families and settle down. These families of North African origin are now in their second, third, or even fourth generation in France, yet many of them are not fully integrated into society (because of problems of high unemployment, poor housing, etc). For some, even though these children of immigrants were born and educated in France, they are not "truly" French.

Enter the Front National. This extreme right-wing political group, founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen and currently headed by his daughter Marine Le Pen, is most famous for its views on immigration. The party calls for a complete halt to immigration, in particular from Muslim countries. Until rather recently, the party leaders demanded the "humane and dignified" repatriation of all legal immigrants in France. Now they only ask for the repatriation of all illegal, criminal, and/or unemployed immigrants...

For the Front National, there is a big difference between these children of North African immigrants (often called "beurs") and the "indigenous" French, or "Francais de souche" (literally "French from the stump/roots"). Overlooking the fact that almost everyone in France has an "immigrant" somewhere in their background and the France itself was formed by waves of invasions and different tribes, the Front National has created a shimmering history for itself of national purity and the pristine values of the Republic. FN followers panic that polls show that by 2060, "Francais de souche" will be the minority in France, because the North Africans "breed like animals" and will crush the secular French society with their "radical Islam."

As in the case of the New Hindu Identity movements, here we see another case of the majority group in power feeling threatened and victimized by the minority. By creating an image of the pure, perfect France (led by Joan of Arc, no less..), they split off everything that is dirty, dangerous and animal-like onto the French of North African origin. The Front National has not been responsible for any violence, but recognizing these same characteristics of splitting and "narcissistic rage" makes me worry.